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ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF
FUNCTIONS: OSHA AND THE NLRB
Benjamin W. Mintz*
On December 29, 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) was signed into law.' Congress designed OSHA "to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions .... ,2OSHA established a new adminis-
trative agency within the United States Department of Labor, namely the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSH Administration).
Congress delegated this new agency broad authority to develop and
promulgate legally enforceable occupational safety and health standards,
and to enforce these standards through workplace inspections, the issu-
ance of citations, and the imposition of civil penalties. In many respects,
OSHA's regulatory structure resembled those of other federal regulatory
programs. However, in one aspect OSHA was unprecedented. Under
the Act, the adjudication of citations and penalties issued by the regula-
tory agency was delegated to a separate administrative entity that was
completely independent of the OSH Administration. This adjudicatory
agency is known as the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (OSH Review Commission or the Review Commission) and is
comprised of three members who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate This novel administrative structure, which
separated adjudicative responsibilities from other agency functions, was
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
A.B. 1948, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1952, Columbia University; Rabbinical Ordination,
Yeshiva University, 1954; Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, United
States Department of Labor, 1970-1982. Professor Mintz acknowledges with appreciation
the valuable assistance of Lauriel F. Dalier and Matthew G. McLaughlin in preparing this
Article.
1. Pub. Law No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1994)). Following its enactment, the statute was sometimes referred to as the Williams-
Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act in recognition of the important role in the
development of the statute played by Senator Harrison A. Williams and Representative
William A. Steiger. Cf. BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 14-17
(1984) (discussing the efforts of Senator Williams and Congressman Steiger in Securing
Passage of the Act). This name is rarely used at present. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act will sometimes be referred to hereinafter as the OSH Act or the Act.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1994).
3. See id. § 661(a).
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mandated neither by constitutional requirements nor the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Rather, OSHA was enacted, in the words of the
late Senator Jacob Javits, who was the main sponsor of the arrangement,
to "more closely accord[] with traditional notions of due process" than
would be possible under a unitary agency model, that is, a scheme that
establishes a single agency to administer both prosecutorial and decision-
making functions
This Article addresses the separation of decision-making and investiga-
tory-prosecutorial functions under OSHA's statutory scheme.6 First, this
Article addresses the constitutional and statutory development of the
separation of agency functions. Second, this Article provides a detailed
description of OSHA's legislative history emphasizing the congressional
debate surrounding the proposed structure of the new agency or agen-
cies. Third, this Article analyzes the legal controversies that have
emerged during OSHA's twenty-five year history involving the separa-
tion of prosecutory and decision-making functions. Finally, this Article
seeks to place OSHA's administrative arrangement in perspective and
evaluates the impact of the split-enforcement structure on OSHA's effec-
tiveness.
I. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
AND SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS
Although the first administrative agencies were created during this na-
tion's infancy, their importance within the governmental structure has
grown at an extraordinary pace. Many constitutional and legal issues de-
riving from the existence of administrative agencies have been debated
and litigated, both in the courts and in scholarly commentary. This Arti-
cle considers one of those issues, namely, the separation of functions
within administrative agencies.
At the highest level of this country's governmental structure, the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers are assigned to different branches:
the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court. While this separa-
tion is not absolute, it is a central feature of the constitutional system
and, on occasion, the Constitutional imperative for separation of powers
has been the basis for the Supreme Court to invalidate legislative enact-
ments.7 In administrative agencies, which are typically assigned respon-
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
5. 116 CONG. REc. 36,532 (1970) (statement of Sen. Javits).
6. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the agency's prosecutory function are
generally intended to include the agency's investigative function as well.
7. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986). In Bowsher, the Court held the
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sibility for regulation of an entire program, the three governmental func-
tions have classically been combined in a single body. This unitary struc-
ture serves a number of purposes, among them, concentration of exper-
tise, focusing of accountability, efficiency of operations, and coordinated
policy making.8
Despite the importance of the commingling of various governmental
functions in the administrative agency, it was recognized from the begin-
ning that this led to several undesirable results. This was particularly
true respecting the combination of the executive functions of investiga-
tion and prosecution with the judicial functions of adjudication and deci-
sionmaking. In substance, it was argued that if the investigator or advo-
cate was permitted to participate in the decision "this may produce a
state of mind incompatible with the objective impartiality which must be
brought to bear in the process of deciding."9 In addition, the investigator
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute placed re-
sponsibility for the execution of the law in the hands of an official, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, who was subject to removal by Congress by methods other than
impeachment. See id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding the legis-
lative veto contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional). In
Chadha, the Court articulated its basic principles on separation of powers. However, the
rationale of the majority of the Court for holding the legislative veto unconstitutional was
the fact that the law in question authorized Congress to engage in lawmaking without fol-
lowing the bicameralism and presentment clauses in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
See id. at 957-58.
8. There is vast literature on the theory and practice of administrative agencies. A
useful introduction to the subject is 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1994). The structure and powers of administra-
tive agencies may raise issues relating to constitutional separation of powers. See Metro-
politan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252, 276-77 (1991) (holding the statute creating the Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority unconstitutional because it would allow Congress to direct the actions of an in-
dependent administrative agency). However, on separations of powers grounds, issues
involving the allocation of functions within an administrative agency are typically charac-
terized as involving "separation of functions." See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra, § 9.9, at 92.
The requirements for separation of functions in administrative agencies are most fre-
quently a statutory issue under the agency's enabling statute or the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA), rather than a constitutional question. See id. § 9.9, at 94-98.
9. S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 56 (1941). The Committee continued:
[T]he advocate-the agency's attorney who upheld a definite position adverse to
the private parties at the hearing-cannot be permitted to participate after the
hearing in the making of the decision. A man who has buried himself in one side
of an issue is disabled from bringing to its decision that dispassionate judgment
which Anglo-American tradition demands of officials who decide questions.
Id.
The Attorney General's Committee was appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to investigate the need for reforms in the administrative process. See id. at 1. Although
the APA was not enacted until 1946, the Attorney General's Committee was very influen-
tial in the debates on its enactment. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in 1946
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or prosecutor participating in the decisionmaking would have had access
to facts and information discovered ex parte and not adduced in an ad-
versarial hearing where testimony is sworn and subject to rebuttal and
cross-examination.'0
The commingling of agency functions in formal adjudicatory hearings
thus raised serious questions as to the fairness of the proceeding. The is-
sue was important in the debates which preceded the enactment of the
1946 Administrative Procedure Act. Some advocated for a requirement
that there be total separation in administrative agencies between adjudi-
catory authority, and investigatory prosecutory authority. Under this
approach, which has been called institutional separation, completely
separate agencies would be created to administer a regulatory program,
each with different functions, in order to assure complete fairness in the
decision-making process."
In its final report, the Attorney General's Committee rejected institu-
tional separation as unnecessary to insure fairness and because it entailed
unacceptable costs to the administrative process. Among the Commit-
tee's major objections to institutional separation were the disadvantages
resulting from the multiplication of separate government agencies and
the danger of friction between the agencies and the bifurcation of policy-
making responsibility. Instead, the Committee recommended an "ap-
propriate internal division of labor."'2 The Committee reasoned that this
would go far in eliminating the unfairness, for the disqualification of in-
vestigators and advocates in decisionmaking would be based on "per-
sonal, psychological [factors],... and the [solution] is simply one of iso-
lating those who engage in the activity."' 3  The Attorney General's
Committee therefore recommended a structure which has come to be
known as the internal separation of functions. This administrative ar-
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1200.
10. See S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 56. The Committee continued to say that "investigators,
if allowed to participate, would be likely to interpolate facts and information discovered
by them ex parte and not adduced at the hearing, where the testimony is sworn and sub-
ject to cross-examination and rebuttal." Id.
11. See id. at 55. The Committee proposed that "the deciding powers of Federal ad-
ministrative agencies should be vested in separate tribunals which are independent of the
bodies charged with the functions of prosecution and perhaps other functions of admini-
stration." Id.
12. Id. at 56.
13. Id. at 59. The Committee also argued that the predispositions of administrative
officials to decide in a certain way "are mainly the product of many factors of mind and
experience, and have comparatively little relation to the administrative machinery." Id. at
59. The only way to eliminate these predispositions, the Committee said, is "through wise
and self-controlled men." Id.
[Vol. 47:877
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rangement was later incorporated into the APA as a requirement for
administrative agencies.
The APA implements the separation of functions in two basic ways.
First, independent officials, now called administrative law judges (ALJs)
are responsible for conducting the initial hearing and may also issue a
preliminary decision. These independent officials are insulated from the
investigative and prosecutory aspects of the proceeding." Second, no of-
ficial of the agency who had a role in the investigation or prosecution of
the case may participate or advise in the decision or agency review of the
case. 5 Through these internal separation requirements, in the view of
the Attorney General's Committee, there would be afforded "substan-
tially complete protection against the danger that impartiality of decision
will be impaired by the personal precommittments of the investigator
and the advocate. 16
In 1947, shortly after the enactment of the APA, Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Amendments (Taft-Hartley Act) to the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)."7 Under Taft-Hartley, among other significant
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994) (providing for an administrative law judge, ap-
pointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105, to preside at the taking of evidence in agency adjudica-
tions). In 1992, the Administrative Conference of the United States published an exten-
sive report on the role of administrative law judges in the administrative process. See
generally Paul R. Verkuil et al., Report for Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Adminis-
trative Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 777 (1992).
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994). This section reads, in relevant part, "[a]n employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions ... may
not ... participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pur-
suant to section 557 of this title ...." Id. The APA contains three exceptions to the sepa-
ration of functions requirement, the most relevant of which states that it does not apply to
a "member or members of the body comprising the agency." Id. § 554(d)(2)(C). Thus, a
member of the Federal Trade Commission would be permitted to participate in both in-
vestigatory and prosecutory activities and later decide the same case. But see Grolier Inc.
v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the exception in section 554 for
members of the agency did not apply to the attorney-advisor to a member who partici-
pated in the investigation of a proceeding and later decided the same case as an adminis-
trative law judge).
As explained by Professor Daniel J. Gifford, the largely unstated premise of the Attor-
ney General's Committee's acceptance of limited commingling at the agency-head level
was that since adjudication was then the Agency's principal method of policymaking, and
decisions on whether to issue complaints were also critical to the policy-formulating role, it
was essential that the Agency head be permitted to participate in decision making in both
the adjudication and prosecution stages of the proceeding. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudi-
cation in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 965,978 (1991).
16. See S. DOC. No. 77-8, at 59-60.
17. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
166 (1994)).
19981
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changes, Congress restructured the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), the administrative agency responsible for adminis-
tering the federal labor relations program. In particular, a new position
was created, the General Counsel, an officer separately appointed by the
President who was assigned exclusive authority to investigate charges
and to decide whether to issue a complaint initiating a prosecution and to
prosecute cases before the NLRB." The Board, on the other hand, con-
tinued to have responsibility for decisionmaking under Taft-Hartley. 9
Thus, shortly after the APA rejected generic requirements for institu-
tional separation in administrative agencies, Congress in Taft-Hartley es-
tablished a structure for the NLRB which embodied a form of total sepa-
ration between investigating and prosecution on one hand, and decision
making on the other.
The controversy over separation of functions in administrative agen-
cies did not terminate with the enactment of APA, nor was it solely a
legislative issue. Challenges under the U.S. Constitution to various
forms of intermingling of prosecutory and decision-making functions in
both federal and state agencies reached the courts on a number of occa-
sions. In several significant decisions in the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that combinations of administrative prosecutory and deci-
sion-making functions did not raise insurmountable objections under the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, in Richardson v.
Perales,° the Supreme Court ruled that a system under which a federal
social security Examiner was responsible both for developing facts and
making a decision on a disability claim was not unconstitutional, saying
that the challenge to the arrangement "assumes too much and would
bring down too many procedures designed, and working well, for a gov-
ernment structure of great and growing complexity."21  Similarly, in
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1994). The General Counsel was given general supervi-
sory responsibility for all attorneys employed by the Board and final authority in investi-
gating and deciding whether or not to issue complaints before the Board. See id.
19. See id. § 160 (detailing the range of powers possessed by the Board, including is-
suing cease and desist orders to injunctions).
20. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
21. Id. at 410. In that case, Pedro Perales became disabled as a result of a back in-
jury. See id. at 390. Mr. Perales's disability claim was denied by the Bureau of Disability
Insurance of the Social Security Administration (SSA) after independent review. See id.
at 394. Subsequently, Mr. Perales appealed the decision of the SSA, based in part on an
allegation that the hearing examiner had the responsibility for gathering evidence and had
a natural bias in favor of the federal government. See id. at 408-09. The Court rejected
the "advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion" holding that SSA's examination procedures
were fair and did not violate procedural due process notions. See id. at 410.
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Withrow v. Larkin,2 a case involving a due process challenge to the pro-
cedures followed by a state board seeking to sanction a physician for pro-
fessional misconduct, the Supreme Court stated that the challenge must
"overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators .... "23 The Court concluded that in that factual context the
"probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker
[was not] too high to be constitutionally [in]tolerable.
'2 4
In sum, therefore, federal agency separation of function arrangements
must be analyzed by the courts under the agency's enabling statute and,
to the extent relevant, the APA. Following the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, in effect, no statute created an institutional separation struc-
ture until OSHA was enacted in 1970. However, institutional separation
was put into place in those regulatory programs in which the prosecuting
agency was required to initiate its enforcement actions in a district court,
rather than in an administrative agency. In this arrangement, the separa-
tion of adjudication from prosecution is complete, since it is carried out
in a separate branch of the government. 25 This structure was embodied
in most areas under the Fair Labor Standards Act and under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related statutes.
II. OSHA AND MSHA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE TAFT-
HARTLEY ACT
The development of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was
26complex and difficult. A variety of sharply conflicting points of view
were brought to bear on Congress during the two-year period when the
statute was being considered. While ultimately the law as passed em-
22. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
23. Id. at 47. In Withrow, a physician practicing in Wisconsin was notified by the
Wisconsin Medical Examining Board that he would be the target of an investigative hear-
ing to determine whether he violated state law by performing abortions. See id. at 38-39.
The physician subsequently sued for an injunction, claiming that the combination of inves-
tigative and adjudicatory functions constituted a violation of his due process rights. See id.
at 39. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the risk of unfairness due to the
combination of these functions must be "intolerably high" before due process will be vio-
lated. Id. at 58.
24. Id. at 58.
25. This is not to suggest that separation of functions considerations are the exclusive,
or even the primary, reasons for establishing regulatory programs with adjudicative
authority situated in the courts.
26. See MINTZ, supra note 1, at 1-33 (discussing OSHA's evolution);
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAw 39-56 (1988) (Stephen A. Bokat & Horace
A. Thompson, III, eds., 1988) [hereinafter OSHL]; (discussing the relevant legislative his-
tory of OSHA); see also Tracy N. Tool, Note, Begging to Defer: OSHA and the Problem of
Interpretive Authority, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1336, 1340-43 (1989).
1998]
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bodies a rigorous enforcement program, the administrative structure es-
tablished in the statute represents a compromise among sharply opposing
viewpoints. There was broad agreement on certain basic principles. For
example, under the program, employer obligations for employee safety
and health would be defined primarily through occupational safety and
health standards, which would be issued after rulemaking proceedings
affording an opportunity for public participation. These standards would
be enforced through workplace inspections and, where violations were
found, civil sanctions could be imposed. Finally, formal adjudications
would be conducted with a right to appeal in the courts to determine if
these sanctions were properly issued. In other words, in the OSHA pro-
gram, the agency or agencies responsible for implementation would have
legislative authority (issuance of standards), executive authority (investi-
gation and prosecution), and adjudicative authority (deciding appeals
from OSH Administration sanctions).
Significant controversial issues arose, however, relating to the alloca-
tion of these various responsibilities. Groups representing the interests
of employees, typically unions, took the position that all responsibilities
should be assigned to a single agency which would be located in the De-
partment of Labor. The business community, on the other hand, while
agreeing that the agency in the Department of Labor, which came to be
known as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, should be
responsible for investigation and prosecution under the new statute, ar-
gued that the standards-setting function and the adjudicatory functions
should be separated and assigned to agencies independent of the De-
partment of Labor. Thus, under the employer view, a three-member
standards board would conduct rulemaking proceedings and promulgate
standards, and a separate commission would conduct formal adjudicatory
hearings and decide cases involving appeals from OSHA enforcement
actions. This administrative arrangement, which parallels the three-
branch structure of the Federal Government was necessary, the business
community argued, to avoid the concentration of and potential abuse of
power by a single agency in the Department of Labor.27
27. The position of the employer groups was articulated by Senator Patrick Dominick
of Colorado, who argued that:
The concentration of all authority for the promulgation of standards, the inspec-
tion and investigation of complaints, the prosecution of cases, and the adjudica-
tion of cases, totally in the hands of the Secretary of Labor is not a balanced ap-
proach. It is this structure, this procedural mechanism, which is objectionable to
me, and I believe objectionable to many people around the country. It is objec-
tionable because concentration of power gives rise to a great potential for abuse.
116 CONG. REC. S37,336 (1970) (statement of Sen. Dominick). This position was the basis
[Vol. 47:877
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The unions, in particular, opposed the separate standards board,
claiming that it was neither constitutionally required nor required by the
APA, and by separating the standards-setting and prosecution authority,
agency policymaking would be crippled and accountability would be un-
dermined."' Ultimately a compromise sponsored by Senator Javits was
adopted." Under the Javits amendment first passed by the Senate and
later incorporated into the Conference bill, the enforcement and stan-
dards setting responsibilities were assigned to the OSH Administration,
while a separate presidentially appointed review commission was as-
signed adjudicatory authority.0 This arrangement reflected an institu-
tional separation of functions that went beyond the internal separation
requirements of the APA. It reflected a political compromise designed
of the Steiger substitute that was passed by the House of Representatives. See H.R. 16785,
92nd Cong., § 2(b)(3) (1970), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 1092 (Comm. Print
1971) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Under this House-passed bill, the National
Occupational Safety and Health Board, appointed by the President, would be responsible
for the development and promulgation of occupational safety and health standards and
the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Commission, also appointed by the Presi-
dent, would be responsible for adjudicating enforcement actions initiated and prosecuted
by the Secretary of Labor. See id.
28. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare rejected the proposals that
would have created the separate standards and adjudicatory boards. See S. REP. NO. 91-
1282, at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5184. In its report, the Committee
expressed its view "that a sounder program will result if responsibility for formulation of
rules is assigned to the same administrator who it [sic] also responsible for their enforce-
ment and for seeing that they are workable and effective in their day-to-day application,
thus permitting cohesive administration of a total program." Id. The Committee also re-
jected the argument that due process required that there be a separate adjudicatory board
on the ground that the APA already required separation of functions within the Depart-
ment of Labor between prosecution and adjudication and "[t]he overwhelming majority of
other regulatory programs are administered in just this fashion, and the requirements of
due process are fully observed." Id. at 15.
29. In arguing for his amendment, Senator Javits offered three reasons why the sepa-
rate adjudicatory panel was preferable: (1) under the procedures of his amendment, speed
of enforcement would be greatly increased; (2) adjudication by an independent panel
would "more closely accord with traditional notions of due process" than would hearing
and determination by the Secretary of Labor; and (3) because of the heavy burden of per-
sonally reviewing large numbers of enforcement cases, the Secretary of Labor would, in
any event, delegate adjudication to a panel of officials within the Department of Labor,
but "not one which is independent." 116 CONG. REC. S36,532-33 (1970).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1994) (creating the OSH Review Commission); id. § 655
(giving the Secretary of Labor authority over the promulgation of standards); id. § 659
(giving the Secretary of Labor authority to pursue enforcement proceedings). Adjudica-
tion of the anti-retaliation provisions of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) and the imminent dan-
ger provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 662(a), take place in the United States District Courts as ac-
tions brought by the Secretary of Labor.
19981
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to accommodate the need for effective administration and unified poli-
cymaking with concerns about fairness in that administration.
In 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
(MSHA).3" This new statute amended earlier statutes dealing with coal,
metal, and non-metal mine safety and health, and transferred primary
regulatory authority for the program from the U.S. Department of Inte-
rior to the U.S. Department of Labor.32 The structure of the new mine
safety and health program was modeled quite closely on the administra-
tive structure under OSHA. Thus, the newly created Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (MSH Review Commission), like the OSH
Review Commission, was authorized to adjudicate sanctions for violation
of standards issued by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSH
Administration), which was located in the Department of Labor.33
In significant respects, both the OSHA and MSHA structures followed
the administrative arrangement of the NLRB in that all three reflected
institutional separation beyond the individual, that is, internal separation
mandated under the APA. However, there were certain significant dif-
ferences between the two safety and health agencies and the NLRB.
From its inception, the five-member NLRB, has had broad lawmaking
authority, which is implemented through its adjudication of unfair labor
practice cases. In contrast, the General Counsel's role is limited by the
31. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-
825 (1994)).
32. See 30 U.S.C. § 557(a) (1994). However, the two occupational safety and health
programs were not consolidated into a single agency in the Department of Labor. Rather,
the new statute created a separate administration, the Mine Safety and Health Admini-
stration (MSH Administration), which paralleled the OSH Administration, and delegated
to this new administration rulemaking and prosecution authority. See id. The legislative
history makes clear that Congress wished to maintain the separate identity of the Mine
Safety and Health program, and in particular, to separate it from the controversies that
had surrounded the OSHA program. Cf. S. REP. No. 95-181, at 11 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3411 (transferring all responsibility for mine safety and health to
a new agency within the Department of Labor, the MSH Administration).
33. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (empowering the MSH Review Commission to review cita-
tions and proposed penalties issued by the Department of Labor). In a number of impor-
tant respects, the enforcement mechanisms under the MSHA differed from those under
OSHA, generally reflecting the more serious and immediate employee hazards in mine
operations. See generally OSHL, supra note 26, at 731-93 (discussing some of the major
provisions of the MSHA); W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of Authority Under the
Mine Act: Is the Authority to Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary of Labor
or in the Review Commission?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 1063, 1065-71 (1996) (discussing the
MSHA's review and enforcement scheme).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275-90 (1974) (chronicling
the Board's definition of "managerial employee" through the case method). The Board
also has authority to promulgate legislative rules. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB,
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Taft-Hartley Act to the investigation and prosecution of cases. In the
OSHA program Congress assigned broad policy-making authority to
OSHA. This authority is implemented both through the promulgation of
legally enforceable occupational safety and health standards and the
making of prosecutory decisions. The role of the Review Commission is
limited to making adjudicatory decisions. As will appear later, however,
this adjudicatory function of the OSH and MSH Review Commissions
does not encompass the same policy-making component as that of the
NLRB. This crucial distinction among the programs accounts for the dif-
ferences in the role of the various constituent agencies in the NLRB,
OSHA, and MSHA programs.
In summary, therefore, several points become clear. First, the U.S.
Constitution established not-too-demanding minimal constitutional re-
quirements for separation of functions in administrative agencies. Sec-
ond, the APA imposes more rigorous separation of function require-
ments, but even these are limited to separation of individuals involved in
investigation and prosecution from those involved in decisionmaking.
Finally, under some regulatory statutes, Congress has established ad-
ministrative structures that encompass even more stringent separation of
function arrangements. The Taft-Hartley Act and the two occupational
safety and health acts, OSHA and MSHA, represent two different ap-
proaches to institutional separation of functions.
III. OSHA SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS: HISTORY OF LITIGATION
The institutional separation established under OSHA has resulted in
litigation over several issues involving the administrative structure of the
OSHA program, and over which the OSH Administration, the Review
Commission, and other parties to the proceedings have disagreed. These
issues are: (1) the party status of the Review Commission in courts of ap-
peals proceedings involving review of decisions of the Review Commis-
sion; (2) the authority of the Review Commission to review the Secretary
of Labor's withdrawal or settlement of a citation and penalty; and (3) in
courts of appeal review of decisions of the Review Commission, where
the OSH Administration and the Review Commission differ in their in-
terpretation of an ambiguous OSHA standard, and where Agency inter-
pretation is entitled to court deference. The OSH Administration view
499 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1991); see also Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991) (noting
that the NLRB's authority to make law through adjudication derives from its legislative
rulemaking authority). The Board has used its legislative rulemaking authority sparingly.
See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 170 (1985) (noting the NLRB's "exclusive reliance on adjudication
as the vehicle for policy formation").
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prevailed regarding all three of these issues. Two of these issues were re-
solved in two Supreme Court decisions while the party-status issue was
decided in decisions of the courts of appeals in a majority of circuits. In
each case, the underlying rationale of the court decision was based on an
understanding of Congress's intention that the Review Commission be
solely an adjudicative agency, with a role similar to that of a district court
reviewing an agency decision, and not a policy-making agency. The OSH
Administration is the policy-making agency under OSHA.
A. Party Status Before the Courts of Appeals
By way of background, under OSHA's enforcement scheme, compli-
ance officers conduct regular inspections of employer workplaces.
Where violations of OSHA standards are disclosed, the OSH Admini-
stration issues a citation describing the violation and setting an abate-
ment date, and, if appropriate, proposing a penalty.35 The employer re-
ceiving the citation and penalty has fifteen working days to contest the
citation and penalty before the Review Commission." An employee rep-
resentative may contest only the date for abatement set in the citation. If
no contest is filed, the citation and penalty becomes a final order of the
Review Commission and may be enforced by the OSH Administration in
a federal court.37
Contested cases are litigated first before an ALJ, an independent deci-
sion-making official, who is nominally employed by the Review Commis-
sion.18 In those evidentiary proceedings, the OSH Administration is the
prosecutor, seeking to uphold the citation and penalty, and, in employer
contests, the employer is respondent in the proceeding.39 An employee
representative has a right to participate in Review Commission pro-
ceedings as parties. ° The three-member Review Commission may as a
matter of discretion review initial decisions of the ALJs. If no review is
granted, the judge's order becomes the final order of the Review Com-
mission.'
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1994).
36. See id. § 659(a), (c).
37. See id. § 659(a).
38. See id. § 6610).
39. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20(b) (1997) (explaining that employers can attain party
status in the event that an employee contests the abatement period in a citation, and like-
wise, an employee can get party status when an employer contests a citation).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
41. See id. § 6610).
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Decisions of the Review Commission may be appealed to an appropri-
ate court of appeals, either by the employer, the employee representa-
tive, or by the Secretary of Labor.42 In the court of appeals, the parties
are the Secretary and the employer and/or the employee representative,
depending on the procedural posture of the case. The dispute which di-
vided the OSH Administration and the Review Commission in American
Cyanimid was whether the Review Commission itself was properly a
party before the court of appeals. The Secretary argued against party
status for the Review Commission, and the Review Commission took the
opposite position.
An analogous issue had arisen with respect to other administrative
agencies and had been settled by the courts in different ways depending
on the agency involved. Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of
the F7C to participate as a party in the court of appeals proceedings re-
viewing its orders, 3 and the NLRB has long participated as a party in the
courts of appeals in proceedings to review Board decisions." On the
other hand, the Benefits Review Board (BRB), which reviews workers
compensation determinations made by the Secretary of Labor for em-
ployees covered by the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensa-
tion Act, was held not to be a party in those review proceedings.4 ' The
42. The Act expressly authorizes the Secretary of Labor, that is the OSH Administra-
tion, to seek review in the Courts of Appeals of decisions of the Review Commission. See
id. § 660(b). The General Counsel of the NLRB has no similar right. In Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. OSHRC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a labor organization representing affected employees which had partici-
pated as a party in the Review Commission proceedings had a right to appeal an adverse
Review Commission decision to the courts of appeals. See 671 F.2d 643, 648-49 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (American Cyanimid). The court rejected the argument that the OSH Administra-
tion's role as exclusive prosecutor precluded the union's right to seek review, holding that,
where it had participated in the proceeding, the union was a party "adversely affected or
aggrieved" by the Review Commission decision within the meaning of the Act. See id. at
649.
43. See Federal Trade Commission v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 607 (1966)
(noting that party status for the FTC in cases involving its enforcement powers constitutes
one of the ancillary powers that is essential to the fulfillment of the agency's statutory du-
ties).
44. See Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Company, 514 U.S. 122, 127 n.2 (1995) (noting that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is "always a party respondent to an employer or employee appeal"). How-
ever, in the courts of appeals, the Board is represented by attorneys from the General
Counsel's office. See STANLEY R. STRAUSS & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD § 6.11, at 105 (5th ed.
1996).
45. See Nacirema Operating Co., Inc. v. Benefits Review Board, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
538 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1976) (granting a motion by the Benefits Review Board that it be
dismissed as a party in appellate proceedings).
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issue thus confronting the courts was to which administrative agency
should the Review Commission be analogized?
Several courts sided with the Review Commission and held that it
should be a party in the court of appeals. 46 These courts relied heavily on
a statement of Senator Javits, who, in proposing his amendment creating
the Review Commission, compared the Review Commission to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.47 These courts reasoned that the Review Com-
mission was like the FTC in all aspects of its adjudicative role and there-
fore should have party status when a party seeks review of its decision.
This statement in the legislative history was found unpersuasive by
other courts of appeals which rejected the Review Commission claim for
party status. Thus, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co.48 believed that Senator
Javits intended only to say that the Review Commission would be similar
to the FTC in its adjudicative role in the limited sense that it too would
conduct formal administrative hearings in contested cases and decide
these cases following the same procedures as the FTC.4 9 The court found
far more significant another lesser-known point in the legislative history
of OSHA involving Senator Javits. In an early bill to establish the
OSHA program introduced by Senator Javits, ° which never was re-
ported by committee, a different administrative arrangement for OSHA
was provided: both adjudicative and rulemaking authority would be as-
signed to a separate national board, and the OSH Administration would
have only investigative and prosecutory authority." Significantly, in that
46. 'See Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 648 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976) (not-
ing that the OSH Review Commission was properly a party on appeal); Brennan v. Gilles
& Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1266-67 (4th Cir. 1974) (same).
47. In introducing his amendment to establish an independent Review Commission,
Senator Javits said "[the amendment] creates a review commission which will deal with all
complaints referred to it by the Secretary and which will have the same type of authority
that the Federal Trade Commission exercises .... LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
27, at 462. After describing the procedure established by the amendment, which included
the ability to issue cease and desist orders by the Review Commission, provided for review
in the court of appeals, and allowed for contempt proceedings in the court of appeals,
Senator Javits said, "[it is the traditional Federal Trade Commission type of procedure."
Id.
48. 622 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. See id. at 1181. This case also considered the issue of the authority of the Review
Commission to review settlements of contested cases by the OSH Administration. See id.
at 1184-85.
50. A similar bill, H.R. 13373, was introduced by Representative Ayers. See H.R.
13373, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 679.
51. See S.2788, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27,
at 31. This administrative arrangement differs from that ultimately adopted by Congress in
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original bill, Senator Javits included a provision that when the OSH Ad-
ministration challenges an action of the Board in court, the Solicitor of
Labor would represent the OSH Administration and the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States would represent the board." Thus, in the struc-
ture as originally conceived by Senator Javits, the independent board
would, at least when challenged by the Secretary, be a party in court of
appeals proceedings. However, in his later amendment, which ultimately
was enacted, Senator Javits made no provision for the separate represen-
tation of the OSH Review Commission. This omission, when viewed in
light of his earlier bill was "critical" in the view of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, demonstrating that it was not Senator Javits's inten-
tion to give party status to the Review Commission under OSHA."
In addition, the court of appeals in Sun Petroleum cited the many pol-
icy-making responsibilities of the OSH Administration in the OSHA
program, in particular, its authority to develop and issue occupational
safety and health standards, its power to decide whether to issue citations
and penalties, and to decide which cases to prosecute. The court con-
cluded that since the Act confers "all rulemaking and policymaking re-
sponsibilities on the Secretary and not the Commission," the Review
Commission was "designed strictly as an independent adjudicator,
with ... no direct policy role in administering the Act. ..., Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals ruled that the Review Commission had no in-
terest in defending its decisions in court and no independent right to rep-
resentation in court of appeals proceedings.55
In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v. OSHRC
(American Cyanamid),56 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
that the rulemaking authority would have been assigned to a separate board, but it also
differs from the arrangement advocated by business groups, in that a single board, sepa-
rate from the Department of Labor, would have had both rulemaking and adjudicative
authority. Interestingly, however, it parallels the existing structure of the NLRB, where
the Board has both adjudicative and rulemaking authority, although Board lawmaking is
normally through adjudication and not rulemaking. Presumably, Senator Javits discarded
this structure because of the strong objections by employee groups to separating the rule-
making authority from the OSHA Administration.
52. See id. § 8(c), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 51. In those
cases in which the Review Commission has appeared in the Court of Appeals as a party to
review proceedings, it was represented by attorneys of the U.S. Department of Justice,
while the OSH Administration was represented by attorneys in the Department of Labor's
Office of the Solicitor. Cf. Sun Petroleum, 622 F.2d at 1180 (noting that the Review com-
mission had been represented by the Department of Justice).
53. See Sun Petroleum, 622 F.2d at 1183.
54. Id. at 1183-84.
55. See id. at 1184.
56. 671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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bia Circuit, in reaching the same conclusion as the Sun Petroleum Court,
concluded that Congress, in creating the Review Commission, "envi-
sioned [the Commission] ... to be similar to a district court" in that its
purpose was to settle disputes between the Secretary and employers
arising under OSHA's citations and penalties, but not that the Review
Commission would have an interest or duty to defend its decisions in the
courts of appeals or a stake in the outcome of the litigation.
The court in American Cyanamid considered the practical implications
of the exclusion of the Review Commission from party status, concluding
that the absence of the Review Commission in the court of appeals
would not foreclose the effective adjudication of the merits of the appeal.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dealt with two separate situa-
tions. First, if the Commission affirms the citation, and the employer
files the appeal, then the OSH Administration is the respondent, and
would defend its citation. If employees had elected party status they
could join the OSH Administration to defend the citation in the court of
appeals. Second, if the Review Commission dismissed the citation, then
18either the Secretary or employees could file a petition for review. In
that case the employer would be the party respondent, since the em-
ployer has the practical stake in affirming the Review Commission deci-
sion.59
In either event, "sufficient adversity" would exist in the court of ap-
peals, and the presence of the Review Commission to defend its decision
would be unnecessary. 6° A majority of the courts of appeals concurred in
57. Id. at 652. The Court continued, noting that the Commission was created "to set-
tle disputes between employers and the Secretary of Labor over citations issued by the
Secretary's inspectors. The commission, like a district court, has no duty or interest in de-
fending its decision on appeal. As a purely adjudicative entity, it has no stake in the out-
come of the litigation." Id. The Supreme Court affirmed this conception of the Review
Commission in Martin v. OSHRC, saying, "we think the more plausible inference is that
Congress intended to delegate to the Commission the type of nonpolicymaking adjudica-
tory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review context." 499 U.S. 144, 154
(1991). These powers included, according to the Supreme Court, reviewing the OSH Ad-
ministration's interpretations for reasonableness and consistency with the statute and
finding facts and applying standards to those facts. See id. at 154-55.
58. See American Cyanamid, 671 F.2d at 650.
59. See id. at 652. The court concluded that "sufficient adversity exists between the
union and the company'to insure proper litigation without the participation of the [Review
Commission]." Id. at 653. Further, the OSH Administration could defend its citation in
the court of appeals against the challenge of the employee representative. See id. In
American Cyanamid, however, OSH Administration did not file a petition for review and
participated in the proceeding only as amicus. See MINTZ, supra note 1, at 467-68 (dis-
cussing the controversial background of the case).
60. See American Cyanamid, 671 F.2d at 652-53. The court of appeals said "[t]o re-
quire the [Review Commission] to appear as a party would parallel requiring a district
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the decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit on this issue, and,
as a practical matter, the Review Commission has not pursued its view
61that it has party status.
To summarize the party status issue, the prevailing view is that the
OSH Review Commission, lacking significant policy-making authority,
differs from the FTC, which, as a unitary agency, possess policy-making
authority through its prosecutory, rulemaking, and adjudicatory actions.
Accordingly, the Review Commission, unlike the FITC, has no party
status in the court of appeals in the review of its decisions. Similarly, the
OSH Review Commission differs from the NLRB, which has policy-
making authority through rulemaking and adjudication, and which is a
party in court of appeals proceedings reviewing decisions. On the other
hand, the General Counsel of the Board is unlike the OSH Administra-
tion in that the General Counsel may not seek court of appeals review of
the Board decision, and is therefore not a party in the court of appeals,
while the OSH Administration by statute may seek review of Review
Commission decisions and may elect to participate in court of appeals
proceedings. Underlying these doctrines are the differing roles of the
General Counsel of the Board and the OSH Administration: the General
Counsel's role under Taft-Hartley is limited to the prosecutory function;
the OSHA Administration is responsible for policy under the OSHA
Act.
B. Authority of Secretary to Withdraw or Settle Citations and Penalties
OSHA gives the Secretary of Labor unreviewable discretion to decide
whether to issue citations and penalties.62 These citations and penalties
may be contested by the cited employer and, to a limited extent, by af-
fected employees. Under Review Commission procedures, after contest,
the Secretary, within specified time limits, is required to file a complaint
court to appear and defend its decision upon direct appeal." Id. at 653.
61. See Glenn A. Guarino, Annotation, Participation by Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission as Party in Proceedings for Judicial Review of its Decision, 65
A.L.R. FED. 599, 601-04 (1983) (discussing the case law surrounding the party status in
court proceedings of the Review Commission); see also Robert D. Moran, Parties to Pro-
ceedings in the Court of Appeals Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 15
B. C. & COMM. L. REV. 1089,1096-1104 (1974) (discussing the party status of the Review
Commission in the courts of appeals, as well as the party status of other agency adjudica-
tory bodies).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1994). Under the rules of the OSH Administration, there
is a procedure for review within the Agency of a decision by an OSH Administration area
office not to issue a citation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.12 (1997). The General Counsel of the
NLRB also has unreviewable discretion to decide whether to file a complaint.
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with the Review Commission.63 The respondent (the employer or em-
ployee representative) then files an answer and an evidentiary hearing is
conducted before an ALJ.
At any point during these proceedings, the OSH Administration may
wish to discontinue the enforcement action by withdrawing the citation
and penalty or by settling the case through a settlement agreement with
the employer or with employees. This action could take place either in
the fifteen-day working period before a contest is filed; or, after the con-
test is filed but before the Secretary files the complaint; or at any time
subsequent to filing the complaint during the Review Commission pro-
ceeding.
The issue thus was whether the OSH Administration's action is subject
to review by the Review Commission. There has been general agree-
ment that prior to the filing of the notice of contest, the OSH Admini-
stration has full discretion to withdraw or to settle citations and penalties,
the reason being that prior to contest the Review Commission jurisdic-
tion has not been invoked. The controverted issue, however, was the
scope of the authority of the Secretary to withdraw or settle citations and
penalties after the contest is filed, at which point the Review Commission
has obtained jurisdiction over the proceeding. The argument was made
that since the Commission has jurisdiction, it may review the OSH Ad-
ministration's decision to withdraw or settle the cases and in its discre-
tion, to deny the OSH Administration's request for withdrawal or to re-
ject the settlement. This issue would typically arise when an employee
representative which has become a party to in the Review Commission
proceeding objects to the OSH Administration's withdrawal or settle-
ment.64
This issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court in Cuyahoga Valley Rail-
way Co. v. United Transportation Union." In that case, the OSH Ad-
ministration issued a citation against the employer, Cuyahoga. The cita-
tion was contested, the OSH Administration filed the complaint, the
employer answered, and the union obtained party status. At that point,
the OSH Administration moved before the ALJ to withdraw the citation,
in part on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the
Cuyahoga's working conditions and partly because the facts disclosed in
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.17.
64. The issue could also arise if the employee representative contested an abatement
date, or if the OSH Administration sought to settle the proceeding with the union and the
employer objected. This scenario is less likely because far fewer employee contests are
filed with the Review Commission.
65. 474 U.S. 3 (1985) (per curiam).
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the investigation did not warrant litigating the case. The union objected,
but the ALJ granted the motion to withdraw. The Review Commission
reversed and remanded the proceeding to the judge to consider the Un-
ion's objections. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
upheld the Commission, noting that the "adversarial process was well
advanced when.., the Secretary attempted to withdraw the citation,"
and held that the Commission "as the adjudicative body, had control of
the case and the authority to review the Secretary's withdrawal of the ci-
tation.""
The Supreme Court in a summary disposition reversed the court of
appeals." After noting that eight other courts of appeals had decided
against Commission jurisdiction to review the Secretary's withdrawals,
the Supreme Court reviewed the "detailed statutory scheme" and con-
cluded that "enforcement of the Act is the sole responsibility of the Sec-
retary" and a "necessary adjunct of that power is the authority to with-
draw a citation and enter into settlement discussions with the
employer." 68 The Commission's function the Supreme Court said was to
act as a "neutral arbiter" in deciding whether citations should be upheld
69
over employer and union objections. Its statutory power did not in-
clude authority to overturn the Secretary's decision to withdraw a cita-
tion. Indeed, the Supreme Court reasoned, under the Sixth Circuit's
view, Congress's intent to separate prosecution and adjudication would
be defeated since the Commission's authority as adjudicator would con-
flict with its power to review the decision whether to withdraw a citation
which is a prosecutory decision.0
While Cuyahoga itself involved the withdrawal of a citation, in princi-
ple the same rule would apply to an OSH Administration settlement.
Indeed, in its decision the Supreme Court equated the OSH Administra-
66. Donovan v. United Transportation Union, 748 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 474
U.S. 3 (1985) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision was
based, in part, on its view that the Review Commission's interpretation of the Act, and not
the OSH Administration's interpretation, was entitled to deference. See id. at 346. The
Supreme Court subsequently held to the contrary on the deference issue. See Martin v.
OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991). Moreover, in Cuyahoga itself, the Supreme Court
noted that the Review Commission had changed its position and no longer sought to re-
view the OSH Administration's dismissal of the citation. See Cuyahoga, 474 U.S. at 5 n.2.
67. See Cuyahoga, 474 U.S. at 7-8. It should be noted that Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Marshall dissented from the per curiam disposition. See id. at 8.
68. Id. at 6-7.
69. See id. at 7; see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 152 (characterizing the Review Commis-
sion as a "neutral arbiter" in enforcement proceedings).
70. See Cuyahoga, 474 U.S. at 7.
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tion's unreviewable power to withdraw a citation with its authority to en-
ter into settlement negotiations."
Although the Supreme Court in Cuyahoga did not refer to the practice
of other federal agencies, in a later case involving the NLRB General
Counsel's authority to settle cases, NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union," the Supreme Court cited the Cuyahoga decision.73 The
Supreme Court in United Food upheld an NLRB regulation providing
that an informal settlement entered into between the General Counsel
and a party after the general counsel has filed a complaint, but before a
Board hearing had commenced, was not subject to Board review and
therefore could not be appealed to a court of appeals. The Supreme
Court concluded that "[tihe General Counsel's unreviewable discretion
to file and withdraw a complaint, in turn, logically supports a reading that
he or she must also have final authority to dismiss a complaint in favor of
an informal settlement, at least before a hearing begins."74 While con-
ceding that the filing of a complaint is the "necessary first step to trigger
the Board's adjudicatory authority," the Court stated that until the
hearing is held "no adjudication has yet taken place" and, therefore, at
that particular point, "settlement or dismissal determinations are prose-
cutorial" and within the discretion of the General Counsel.75
Since the reviewability of informal settlements entered into after the
hearing had begun was not before the Court, the Supreme Court did not
directly deal with the question of whether the General Counsel's with-
drawal or settlement after hearing was a prosecutorial decision.76 In the-
ory, it is at least arguable that even after the hearing has begun, and, in
the words of the Supreme Court in United Food, "adjudication has taken
place," the decision of the General Counsel or the OSH Administration
to withdraw or settle is still prosecutorial, just as decisions or strategy
71. See id. The Supreme Court also said that the Sixth Circuit view to allow the Re-
view Commission to review the OSH Administration's decision to withdraw a citation
"would discourage the Secretary from seeking voluntary settlements with employers in
violation of the Act, thus unduly hampering the enforcement of the Act." Id. at 7. A set-
tlement agreement normally entails the withdrawal of the citation and penalty and the
submission of the settlement in its place.
72. 484 U.S. 112 (1987) (United Food).
73. See id. at 126.
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id. at 125-26.
76. Nor did the Supreme Court in Cuyahoga deal with the issue of the Review Com-
mission's authority to review the OSH Administration's withdrawal or settlement after
hearing.
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taking place at the hearing on how to proceed (which witnesses to call
and the like) are routinely characterized as prosecutorial decisions.77
C. Deferral to Regulatory Interpretations
In 1991, in Martin v. OSHRC,7' a unanimous Supreme Court held that
the power to issue "authoritative" interpretations of standards was a
"necessary adjunct" of the OSH Administration's authority to issue
standards and therefore the courts were obligated to accord deference to
the Secretary's reasonable interpretations of standards.79 The Supreme
Court rejected the view of several courts of appeals that where the Re-
view Commission differed with the OSH Administration's reasonable in-
terpretation, the Review Commission, as the adjudicative body in the
OSHA program, was entitled to deference from the Court.'°
77. This would suggest that in administrative litigation, the question whether a par-
ticular action is prosecutorial or adjudicatory is not determined primarily on the basis of
when it takes place, that is, at which point in the proceeding a prosecutorial action be-
comes adjudicatory, but rather is determined on the basis of the nature of the action.
Thus, if the General Counsel (or the OSH Administration) withdraws a complaint, this
action is inherently prosecutorial whenever it takes place. When the Board (or the Re-
view Commission) decides the case after a hearing on the record, this is inherently an ad-
judicatory decision. A later case, Reich v. OSHRC, raised the issue of whether the deci-
sion by the Review Commission to reduce an OSHA violation from an other-than-serious
violation to a de minimis violation was prosecutorial or adjudicatory. See 998 F.2d 134,
138 (3d Cir. 1993) (Erie Coke). De minimis violations are not subject to Review Commis-
sion jurisdiction. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (a) (1994) (noting that "[t]he Secretary may pro-
scribe procedures for the issuance of a notice in lieu of a citation with respect to de mini-
mus violations"). The OSH Administration and the union, with whom the dissent agreed,
argued that reducing a violation to de minimis is tantamount to dismissing the citation,
and therefore is a prosecutory decision that can be taken only by the OSH Administration.
See Erie Coke, 998 F.2d at 138; see also id. at 142 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). A majority of the Third Circuit disagreed, holding that in reducing a cita-
tion to de minimis, after the hearing, the Review Commission was performing its adjudica-
tory role in making findings of facts and applying the OSHA standards to those facts. See
id. at 139.
78. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
79. See id. at 152. In Martin, the OSH Administration issued a citation to CF&I Steel
Corporation for violation of its coke-oven standard. See id. at 148. On appeal, the Review
Commission vacated the AL's decision in favor of the OSH Administration, instead of-
fering a different interpretation of the coke-oven standard. See id. at 148-49. The Review
Commission interpreted the "respiratory protection program" referred to in the relevant
regulation as requiring "only that an employer train employees in the proper use of respi-
rators .... I d. at 149. By contrast, the Secretary of Labor interpreted the same regula-
tion to require the employer to ensure proper fit of the employees' respirators. See id.
80. See id. at 150 n.4 (citing in support of deference to the Commission over the Sec-
retary, Brock v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 828 F.2d 373, 376 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1987); Brock v.
Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1986); Marshall v. Western Electric,
Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977)). For a discussion of the deference issue prior to the
Martin decision, see Tool, supra note 26, at 1350-55; see also Recommendations of the
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In reversing the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holding
that it was the Review Commission that was entitled to court deference,
the Supreme Court first reasoned that an administrative agency is enti-
tled to substantial deference for its construction of its own regulations.81
The issue is whether the OSH Administration or the Review Commis-
sion is the relevant Agency for purposes of this deference. Second, the
OSH Administration is in the "best position" to render authoritative in-
terpretations of its regulations. As the prosecuting authority under the
Act, the OSH Administration "comes into contact with a much greater
number of regulatory problems than does the [Review] Commission"
and is therefore "more likely to develop the expertise relevant to assess-
ing the effect of a particular regulatory interpretation." '82
Third, the Court noted that in enacting OSHA, Congress rejected pro-
posals that would have created a separate board that would be responsi-
ble for promulgating occupational safety and health standards. It did so,
according to the relevant committee report, so that a single official would
have both responsibility for formulating rules and for seeing that they are
both workable and effective in day to day application, and, in addition, to
make it possible to hold a single official accountable for implementation
of the Act. To separate rulemaking authority from authoritative inter-
pretative authority would defeat these purposes.
Fourth, the lower court ruled that the Review Commission had the
normal complement of adjudicatory powers possessed by "traditional"
administrative agencies, such as the NLRB, including the right to
authoritatively interpret regulations.8 However, the Supreme Court said
that in those "traditional" agencies, adjudication activity encompasses
the exercise of lawmaking, or policy-making powers. Thus, for example,
NLRB's authority to establish labor relations policy on a case-by-case
basis through adjudication derives from its rulemaking authority." The
Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. 305. 86-4 (1992) (recommending
that Congress require the adjudicatory agency to accept the rulemaking agency's interpre-
tation of the standard unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law).
81. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 150 (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) and
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
82. Id. at 152-53.
83. See Dole v. OSHRC, 891 F.2d 1495,1498 (10th Cir. 1989) (CF&I), rev'd sub nom.,
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the
statements of Senator Javits that the Review Commission would have the normal com-
plement of adjudicative powers possessed by other administrative agencies. See id.
84. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 154. The Court cited NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 292-294 (1974), in stating that an agency may properly make law and policy
"only because the unitary agencies also.., had been delegated the power to make law and
policy through rulemaking." Martin, 499 U.S. at 154. This is a somewhat loose reading of
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Review Commission, on the other hand, has no rulemaking authority,
and therefore its adjudicatory power is limited to fact-finding and does
not include authority to make OSHA policy. The Supreme Court de-
scribed the Review Commission's adjudicatory authority as "nonpolicy
making adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-
review context. '"85
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of which interpreta-
tions of the OSH Administration were entitled to deference. The Court
emphasized that only "reasonable" interpretations were entitled to def-
erence. Further, it stated that not only are the Secretary's formally
promulgated standards entitled to deference, but also that the OSH Ad-
ministration's "less formal means of interpreting regulations prior to is-
suing a citation," such as those embodied in "interpretive rules" and
published "agency enforcement guidelines," referring specifically to
OSH Administration's Field Operations Manual.86 Indeed, the Supreme
Court further explained that interpretations embodied in agency actions,
as for example an interpretation implicit in the issuance by the OSH
Administration of a citation are also entitled to deference since the in-
terpretation is "as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers" as
the promulgation of a standard. 7 On the other hand, "litigating posi-
tions" that are advanced for the first time in the reviewing court are post-
hoc views of the Agency attorneys that follow, rather than precede,
8agency enforcement action and are therefore not entitled to deference.
Bell. While Bell clearly said that the Board could make law and policy through adjudica-
tion, and ultimately, the Board was found to have rulemaking authority, the Board's adju-
dicative lawmaking authority was not expressly linked to its rulemaking authority by the
Supreme Court in Bell. See Bell, 416 U.S. at 294 (noting that "the Board is not precluded
from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding"). In deciding that the Re-
view Commission had no lawmaking and policy making authority, the Supreme Court, in
Martin, reasoned that an agency's power to adjudicate does not, standing alone, indicate
that the agency has law and policy making authority, and that the issue of the agency's
lawmaking and policy making authority must be determined by looking at all aspects of
the agency's responsibility. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 152-54. Nor does the suggestion in
Martin that the Board is a lawmaking agency because it is a "unitary" agency seem en-
tirely accurate, since the NLRB is not "unitary" in the traditional sense that the FTC is a
"unitary" agency, since the General Counsel has separate prosecutorial authority. The
crucial issues would seem to be: what was Congress's intent, and to which agency did Con-
gress intend to assign policy making authority.
85. Martin, 499 U.S. at 154.
86. Id. at 157. The Field Operations Manual was originally called the Compliance
Operations Manual, see MINTZ, supra note 1, at 337 n.7, and is now called the Field Op-
erations Manual. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 157. The Manual is widely distributed to Agency
staff and the public, but is not published in the Federal Register, nor is its publication pre-
ceded by notice-and-comment rulemaking.
87. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157.
88. See id. at 156-57. The Supreme Court has refused to accept post hoc explanations
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The Martin decision articulates in full a number of the important
themes relating to the administrative structure of OSHA that had been
stated in earlier court decisions and scholarly commentary since the in-
ception of the program. The Supreme Court emphasized the limited
adjudicatory role that Congress envisaged would be played by the Re-
view Commission as well as the central lawmaking and policy role that
was assigned to the OSH Administration. The Court's reading of
OSHA's legislative history, particularly the fact that Congress rejected a
separate standards board, was a key factor in its conclusion that Congress
intended only to separate adjudication from policy responsibilities, and
not to effect any split in the policy-making responsibilities. The Court's
treatment of the so-called "traditional" administrative agencies such as
NLRB was particularly significant because it clarified the critical struc-
tural distinctions between NLRB and OSHA, and particularly the differ-
ences in the adjudicatory roles of the Board and the Review Commis-
sion.
Subsequent litigation has defined the application of Martin by dealing
with the issue of whether the OSH Administration's interpretation of a
standard is reasonable in a particular factual situation.89 Since Martin
dealt with the interpretation of OSHA standards, it did not consider
whether deference to the OSH Administration is equally appropriate in
cases involving a conflict in interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision. The Supreme Court's rationale for deference to the OSH
Administration's expertise and its policy role would seem to apply
equally to cases involving statutory interpretations. However, in a recent
decision, the Review Commission refused to defer to the interpretation
of the OSH Administration of the statutory General Duty clause. 90
D. Application of Separation of Functions for OSHA Rulemaking
United Steelworkers of America v. MarshalP' involved a challenge to
the OSH Administration's occupational health standard regulating lead
in the workplace." The petitioning employer association, the Lead In-
of OSHA standards preferred for the first time by attorneys for the Agency in the court of
appeals or review of the standard. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 539 (1981).
89. See Secretary of Labor v. Union Tank Car Co.. 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1067,
1069-70 (OSHRC Oct. 16, 1997) (finding "unreasonable" the OSHA Administration's in-
terpretation that the language of its personal protective equipment standard, requiring
that equipment be "provided," means that the employer must pay for the equipment).
90. See Secretary of Labor v. Arcadian Corp., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1345, 1345-46
(DSHRC 1995).
91. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (United Steelworkers).
92. See id. at 1202. After lengthy rulemaking, OSHA amended its existing occupa-
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dustries Association (LIA), among many other arguments3 claimed that
the contacts between the Assistant Secretary for OSHA, who made the
final decision on the provisions of the lead standard, and the OSH Ad-
ministration staff attorney who represented the Agency in the rulemak-
ing proceeding, constituted prohibited contacts between the decision
maker, the Assistant Secretary, and the attorney who engaged in investi-
gative and prosecutory functions. LIA particularly emphasized the ad-
versary nature of this hybrid rulemaking proceeding and argued that "the
agency decision maker engaged in ex parte ... contacts with one of the
adverse sides in the rulemaking"; thus, the APA's separation of functions
requirements applicable to formal adjudications should also apply to
rulemaking of this hybrid nature.94
The court of appeals conceded the adversary tone and format of the
proceedings and assumed for the purpose of decision that the rulemaking
attorney should be considered an "advocate" for purposes of decision.95
However, the court, relying on its earlier decision in Hercules, Inc. v.
EPA9' rejected LIA's argument on several grounds. First the APA by itsterms applied the separation of functions requirements only to formal
tional health standard for lead by lowering the permissible exposure limit to 50 micro-
grams per cubic meter of air (50 ug/m3). See id. at 1204. It has long been known that seri-
ous health hazards, including kidney damage and damage to the peripheral and central
nervous system, result from extensive absorption of lead by humans. See id.
93. LIA raised both substantive and procedural arguments to almost every aspect of
the lead standard. The United Steelworkers of America also challenged certain provi-
sions. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all the procedural challenges and most
of the substantive challenges, except that it remanded to the OSH Administration for fur-
ther consideration of the issue of the feasibility of the new permissible exposure in certain
industries. See id. at 1311. The litigation was not finally resolved until 1996. See
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 199-200 (Victoria L. Bar and Ilise Lavy
Feitshans, eds., Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Bar & Feitshans] (discussing the history of United
Steelworkers).
94. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1210. The OSHA provisions on the promulga-
tion of standards require procedures in addition to the minimum rulemaking procedures
required by Section 553 of the APA. In particular, the Act mandates a public hearing, if
requested. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(3) (1994); see also Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 472 (D.C. Cir 1974) (noting the differences between OSHA and
the APA). OSH Administration rulemaking and rulemaking involving similar procedures
by other federal agencies is generally referred to as "hybrid" rulemaking. See United
Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1213.
95, See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1211-12. At the same time, the Court of Ap-
peals experienced unease at the idea that the attorney in a rulemaking is an advocate for a
particular "side," since in rulemaking, the agency is not determining the "specific rights of
a specific party" Id. at 1211. This is a basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion, the former being a "legislative" process and the latter analogous to the judicial proc-
ess. Cf id. (discussing in detail the role of OSHA attorneys). See generally DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 8, at § 6.1 (discussing in detail the role of OSHA attorneys).
96. 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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adjudication."' The court also failed to find any intention by Congress in
the statute, even though it included additional procedural rulemaking re-
quirements beyond those in the APA to import any adjudicatory separa-
tion of functions requirements into OSH Administration rulemaking.9
Moreover, the court of appeals noted that the contacts between the staff
attorney and Assistant Secretary did not involve extra-record material,
and therefore did not implicate any limitations on the use of ex parte ma-
terial in rulemaking.99 However one-sided the views expressed may have
been, the court said they "remained within the general boundaries of the
deliberative process." '  Finally, the court of appeals underscored the
overriding policy and practical consideration impelling its decision, stat-
ing that "[i]n an enormously complex proceeding like an OSHA standard
setting, it may simply be unrealistic to expect an official facing a massive,
almost inchoate, record to isolate herself from the people with whom she
worked in generating the record."' O'
The decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in the OSHA lead case, and in the earlier EPA case, Hercules, in
refusing to require separation of functions into rulemaking, suggest a
number of interrelated conclusions. The court in these and in several
other related decisions established that although "hybrid" rulemaking
97. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1213; see also Hercules, 598 F.2d at 125 (set-
ting forth a more detailed listing of the APA's legislative history, and noting that "[elven
in formal rule making proceedings subject to sections 7 and 8, the [Administrative Proce-
dure] Act leaves the hearing officer entirely free to consult with any other member of the
agency's staff"). The Court of Appeals in United Steelworkers discussed the separation of
functions issue together with the ex parte issue, and, of course, the two are closely related,
since one of the main rationales for separation of functions is the possibility of ex parte
communications between an investigator/advocate and decision maker.
98. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d 1213. The Court said "[t]he legislative history
shows that Congress consistently turned back efforts to impose such formal procedures on
OSHA standard-setting." Id.
99. See id. at 1212 n. 20. The court assumed that the standards attorney may have
influenced the decision by reinforcing "according to his bias," certain information that was
already in the record, but insisted that this case did not involve "actual new evidence"
given to and relied on by the decisionmaker. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis omitted).
101. Id. at 1216. The Court, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), which "counsels restraint" in courts imposing nonstatutory procedural require-
ments on agencies, concluded that the "issue was one for Congress or the agencies to re-
solve." United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1216. While the court of appeals in Hercules fo-
cused on the issues raised by the consultations between attorneys and the decision maker,
see Hercules, 598 F.2d at 127, the Court in United Steelworkers raised doubts as to the wis-
dom of singling out the attorney in the case when non-legal staff also were involved in the
decision making and participated with "equal vigor" in the rulemaking, see United Steel-
workers, 647 F.2d at 1212 n.19.
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included more elaborate procedures than classic APA-type informal
rulemaking, it was nonetheless still rulemaking and not adjudication, and
therefore formal adjudicatory procedures should not be imposed on
these rulemaking proceedings.' °2 In addition, the court assigned consid-
erable importance to the need in complex rulemaking proceedings for
the expertise of the entire agency to be available in determining the sub-
stance of the legislative rule. This goal would be frustrated, the court
said, if the attorneys who conducted the rulemaking were separated from
those who decide on the rule. If separation were enforced, the court
stated that the Assistant Secretary of OSHA would be required to have a
completely separate staff to advise her evaluation of the complex rule-
making record. Despite these overriding considerations, the court in
Hercules expressed "uneasiness" about the "appearance of unfairness"
involved in the contacts between staff involved in the rulemaking and the
decision maker. Once again, we observe the basic tension, between
fairness and appearances of fairness on one side and agency efficiency on
the other hand, which in the OSHA context at least has been resolved in
adjudication by strengthening the separation of functions (institutional
separation).
V. POST-MARTIN OSHA LITIGATION ON SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS
The decision of the Supreme Court in Martin clearly established the
obligations of a court to defer to the OSH Administration's interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous standard. While Martin did not expressly deal with
the issue, the necessary implication of Martin is that the Review Com-
mission, in exercising its adjudicatory function, is obliged to follow the
policy determinations of the OSH Administration as expressed in its in-
terpretations of standards. The bulk of cases applying Martin involved
the question whether the OSH Administration interpretation was rea-
sonable and entitled to deference or "unreasonable" and not worthy of
102. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ex parte restric-
tions do not apply to hybrid rulemaking); Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,
627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that the strict rules disqualifying biased deci-
sion makers do not apply in hybrid rulemaking proceedings).
103. Hercules, 598 F.2d at 127 ("The fact that the attorneys who represented the staff's
position at the administrative hearing were later consulted by the judicial officer who pre-
pared the final decision possibly gives rise to an appearance of unfairness, even though the
consultations did not involve factual or policy issues.").
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deference.04 In Secretary of Labor v. Arcadian Corp.,05 decided by the
Review Commission in 1995 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in 1997, a significant issue was the extent to which Martin applied to
OSH Administration statutory interpretations.
By way of background, in enforcing OSHA requirements, the OSH
Administration normally issues one simple citation item for each stan-
dard alleged to have been violated and a single civil penalty for each
violation. Thus, for example, if an employer failed to comply with
OSHA's perimeter guarding standards, this would be a single violation
and penalty. The Act requires employers not only to comply with the
requirements of OSHA standards, but also, in the general duty clause, to
"furnish to each of his employees... a place of employment.., free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees."'' 6 In enforcing the general duty
clause, the OSH Administration had traditionally issued a single citation
item and single proposed penalty for each violation.
In the early 1990s, responding at least in part to criticism that its en-
forcement policy was insufficiently strong, the OSH Administration is-
sued a statement that established an enforcement policy that would
authorize field staff in certain "egregious" cases to count each instance of
non-compliance as a separate violation for which a separate penalty is
proposed.'08 The Arcadian case involved an explosion at a fertilizer plant
in which eighty-seven employees were injured. The OSH Administration
cited Arcadian for eighty-seven separate willful violations of the general
duty clause. A $50,000 penalty was proposed for each of the eighty-
seven violations, a total of $4,350,000. Arcadian contested the citations
and penalties, the ALJ ruled that the OSH Administration's separate ci-
tation and penalty for each employee was "inappropriate," and the OSH
Administration appealed to the Review Commission."
104. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Union Tank Car Co., 18 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1067,
1069-70 (OSHRC Oct. 16, 1997) (finding an OSH Administration interpretation "unrea-
sonable").
105. 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1345 (OSHRC Sept. 15, 1995). The Fifth Circuit's decision
is reported at Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192 (1997).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994).
107. For the background of the changes in the OSH Administration's enforcement
policy, see Benjamin W. Mintz, History of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE 832-33 (4th ed. 1995).
108. See Bar & Feitshans, supra note 93, at 93-94 (describing the "egregious" enforce-
ment policy).
109. See Arcadian, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1346.
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The Review Commission, with one member dissenting, upheld the de-
cision of the AU. 11 The Review Commission initially determined that
the OSH Administration interpretation that the general duty clause
permitted per-employee citations and penalties was not "reasonable"
and, therefore, under Martin was not entitled to deference."' In addi-
tion, the Commission held that even if OSH Administration's interpreta-
tion was "reasonable," it was not entitled to deference. Martin, the Re-
view Commission said, involved the interpretation of an OSHA
standard. At issue in Arcadian, however, was the interpretation of a
statutory provision, the general duty clause, "the adjudication of which
Congress expressly left to the Commission, not a regulation that the Sec-
retary himself drafted and promulgated."'' Moreover, the Review
Commission concluded that the case "touche[d] directly upon the appro-
priateness of the penalty, which is solely within the Commission's statu-
tory authority.""' 3 Finally, the Review Commission ruled that the OSH
Administration instruction establishing the egregious policy was a "dis-
cretionary enforcement guideline not published in either the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations," and therefore not entitled
to deference.
Review Commission Chairman Weisberg dissented, stating that al-
though the OSH Administration's interpretations of the statute in other
situations may not be entitled to deference, its interpretation in Arcadian
was due deference here since it relates "directly" to the OSH Admini-
stration's prosecutorial discretion and went "to the heart of [its] en-
forcement authority.""' 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
110. See id. at 1345-46, 1353.
111. See id. at 1351. A major factor in the Review Commission's reasoning that OSH
Administration's interpretation of the General Duty Clause was unreasonable was the fact
that "for more than twenty years," the focus of the OSH Administration's enforcement of
section 5(a)(1) had been on the "existence of conditions which constitute a recognized
hazard that can feasibly be abated" and the Agency has cited separate violations only "[to
the extent a hazard is separate and its abatement is peculiar to it." In Arcadian, the Re-
view Commission emphasized, only a single hazard was involved. See id. at 1350-51. In
earlier decisions, the Review Commission had upheld separate citations and penalties in
cases involving violations of standards or OSH Administration regulations (record-
keeping violations under 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (1996)), depending on the language of the pro-
vision in question. See Secretary of Labor v. Caterpillar Inc., 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2153,
2172 (OSHRC Feb. 5, 1993). Arcadian, however, involved a violation of the general duty
clause.
112. Arcadian, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1352.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1360. Chairman Weisberg asserted that he would nonetheless require the
OSH Administration to show why "instance-by-instance citations" were warranted in the
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firmed the Review Commission,"6 but based its decision on the narrower
ground that the OSH Administration interpretation was inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the general duty clause, and therefore not enti-
tled to deference under the Chevron analysis. 117 The Court of Appeals
did not reach any of the other deference issues determined by the Re-
view Commission.
While the Supreme Court decision in Martin plainly permitted the
Court of Appeals and the Review Commission to refuse to affirm an
OSH Administration interpretation that it found "unreasonable," the
reasoning of the Review Commission in Arcadian in other respects is
very troublesome. The Review Commission relied on three grounds for
not deferring to "reasonable" OSH Administration interpretations of
statutory provisions.
First, the Review Commission distinguished between interpretations of
ambiguous standards and the interpretations of statutory provisions. To
be sure, the Martin case dealt with a standards interpretation. However,
the underlying Supreme Court rule mandating deference to administra-
tive interpretations evolved in cases involving statutory interpretation
and was regularly applied in statutory cases. Indeed, Chevron, the
strongest recent articulation by the Supreme Court of deference to an
agency, involved court deference to an EPA interpretation of a provision
in the Clean Air Act.I" The Review Commission in Arcadian, obviously
troubled by its implications, reasoned that Chevron was distinguishable
because EPA, unlike the OSH Administration, has "both administrative
and adjudicative functions."".9 This purported distinction misses the ba-
sic thrust of Martin and Chevron. The EPA is like the OSH Administra-
particular case. See id. Among the relevant factors to be considered, Chairman Weisberg
said, were: whether the "unit of prosecution" under the standard was an "individual act
rather than an overall course of conduct;" and whether "the circumstances in the case
[are] extraordinary, i.e., that the Secretary is warranted in using this extraordinary means
of enforcement." 1d. at 1360-61. Chairman Weisberg would therefore have remanded the
case to determine if the particular circumstances would warrant the "extraordinary" rem-
edy. See id. at 1361.
116. See Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir. 1997).
117. See id. at 1196.
118. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-42
(1984). Chevron involved an Environmental Protection Agency regulation that treated all
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial complex as though they were under-
neath a single "bubble." See id. at 840. At issue was the meaning of the "stationary
source" as defined by the Clean Air Act. See id. at 841. In reviewing the EPA's construc-
tion of the statute, the Court developed what has come to be known as the "Chevron two-
step test"-the first inquiry being whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue, and
the second, to be applied only in the absence of clear legislative language, whether the in-
terpretation offered by the agency is reasonable. See id. at 842-43.
119. Arcadian, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1352.
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tion because both have the central policy role in their respective pro-
grams. That the Review Commission and not the OSH Administration
has adjudicatory authority is, under Martin, immaterial for purposes of
determining deference, since the point of Martin is that deference is due
to an Agency because Congress has assigned it a policy role, and in the
OSHA program, it is the OSH Administration, and not the Review
Commission, which has the policy role.' 2
The Review Commission also suggested that deference is more appro-
priate where standards are involved on practical grounds, since the OSH
Administration developed and issued the standards, while it is Congress
that enacts statutes. However, the Supreme Court has elaborated on
many other reasons why the views of the Agency which administers a
statute are worthy of court deference. In relying on the OSH Admini-
stration's expertise respecting its own regulations in Martin, the Supreme
Court addressed the case before it, and plainly did not intend to exclude
deference to agency interpretations in other situations.
Second, the Review Commission argued that it is given express
authority under section 17(j) of the statute "to assess all civil penalties
,,12 u t
provided in this section .... But it is not disputed that the Act assigns
adjudicative authority to the Review Commission. Martin holds, how-
ever, that this adjudicative authority must be exercised with appropriate
deference to the policy determinations of the OSH Administration.
Thus, under Martin, the Review Commission is authorized to adjudicate
the citation based on a violation of the standard, but the "law of the
case" would be the OSH Administration standard. So, the adjudication
120. Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court referred in Chevron to the EPA as "an
agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities" and characterized
its interpretation at several points as a "policy choice." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. There is
no indication in Chevron that the EPA's adjudicative authority, to the extent that it exists,
was the basis for court deference.
121. For example, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the Supreme
Court, in deferring to the Board's interpretation of the term "employee" in the National
Labor Relations Act, cited various factors warranting reliance on the Board's view:
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives [the Agency] fa-
miliarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in
various industries, with the abilities and needs of the workers for self-
organization and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bar-
gaining for the peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers.
Id. at 130. For cases involving deference to statutory interpretation, see 1 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 107-09.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1994). The Review Commission is instructed to give "due
consideration" to four factors in deciding the appropriateness of the penalty: the "size of
the business" involved, the "gravity of the violation," the "good faith of the employer,"
and the "history of previous violations." Id.
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of penalties must be exercised with due deference to the OSH Admini-
stration's policy interpretation on the meaning of the statutory provisions
underlying the penalties.
Finally, the Review Commission noted that the OSH Administration
policy on per-employee citations and penalties was not officially pub-
lished. However, this assertion contradicts express language in Martin,
which holds that even an OSH Administration "litigating position" be-
fore the Review Commission, which is obviously not published in the
Federal Register, is entitled to deference because it is an "exercise of
delegated lawmaking power.
12 4
In sum, while there may be merit in the Review Commission's (and the
Court's) ultimate conclusion that the OSH Administration's "egregious"
policy is inconsistent with the general duty clause, the Review Commis-
sion's views on deference go far in undercutting principles that were sup-
posed to have been settled in Martin.
VI. SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS: OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
This discussion has focused on the OSH Administration and on the
NLRB as illustrating two differing approaches of institutional separation
of functions. The administrative structure of the federal mine safety and
health program, also situated in the Department of Labor, closely paral-
lels that of the OSH Administration and several other federal agencies
with adjudicatory responsibility, such as the Merit Systems Protection
Board'25 and the Benefits Review Board,26 which exhibit varying degrees
of institutional separation. Significantly, in a number of Federal regula-
tory programs, some recently enacted, enforcement responsibility is as-
signed to an administrative agency and adjudication of enforcement ac-
123. See id. The Review Commission's adjudicative authority thus exists concurrently
with the OSH Administration's policy-making prosecutory authority and does not over-
ride the OSH Administration authority. See supra note 77 (discussing the court of appeals
decision in Erie Coke).
124. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1994).
125. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703 (1994). The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
"is an independent Government agency that operates like a court." 5 C.F.R. § 1200.1
(1997). The MSPB was "created to ensure that all federal government agencies follow
Federal merit system practices." Id. The Board is responsible for "adjudicating Federal
employee appeals of agency personnel actions. Id. The Board is comprised of three
Members, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See id. § 1200.2.
126. The Benefits Review Board is similar in makeup and procedure to the National
Labor Relations Board, except that its members are appointed by the Secretary of Labor,
and not the President. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(1) (1994). It is charged with enforcing com-
pensation orders granted under the Longshore and Harborworkers' Compensation Act.
See id. § 921(b)(3).
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tions is assigned to the federal district courts. Notable among these is the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),"7 enacted in the New Deal
era, under which prosecutory authority is vested in the Wage and Hour
Administration in the Department of Labor, but under which most adju-
dication of enforcement actions take place in the U.S. district 
courts. l21
Several recently enacted labor regulatory programs have been modeled
on the FLSA structure, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA),29 the Polygraph Protection Act,'" and the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN),"' requiring notice to employ-
ees of certain plant closings, in that adjudication of enforcement actions
takes place in the U.S. district courts.
The recent congressional debate and statutory enactment in the fed-
eral air safety program is instructive on the issue of separation of func-
tions. Two administrative agencies under earlier statutes were assigned
roles in this program.132 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
was delegated both regulatory authority over air safety, including re-
sponsibility for the promulgation of regulations on air safety, investiga-
tions to ensure compliance with these regulations, and the bringing of en-
127. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1994)).
128. The Act is administered in the Department of Labor by the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion and headed by an Administrator. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994). The Act generally
sets the minimum wage, see id. § 206(a)(1), and maximum hours, see id. § 207(a)(1), to be
worked in the United States.
129. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)).
The FMLA provides for 12 weeks of unpaid leave for a number of considerations with a
guarantee of equivalent pay and benefits upon return from the leave. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2614(a)(1) (1994). In addition, it provides backpay and interest for those employees
who are wrongly denied leave by their employers. See id. § 2617(a)(1).
130. Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009
(1994)). The act makes it illegal for an employer to directly or indirectly require employ-
ees to submit to a polygraph (lie-detector) test. See 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1) (1994). Moreover,
the Act provides for civil penalties up to $10,000 for employers who violate its provisions.
See id. § 2005(a)(1).
131. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2100-2109
(1994)). It requires, in most circumstances, that the employer delay a plant closure until
60 days after delivery to an employee representative and government officials of notice to
close a plant or effect a large layoff. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994). In addition, it pro-
vides for backpay and benefits for those employees affected by an employer's violation of
the Act. See id. § 2104(a)(1).
132. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Report for Recommendation 91-8: Adjudica-
tion of Civil Penalties Under the Federal Aviation Act, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND REPORTS 765-861 (1991) [hereinafter
ACUS] (elucidating both the statutory framework of the air safety program and its rele-
vant background).
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forcement actions where violations were found.133 The FAA also has
general responsibility for issuing certificates for most aviation businesses
and functions. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in
addition to its authority to investigate transportation accidents and make
appropriate recommendations on safety, was responsible for adjudication
in proceedings brought by the FAA to revoke a certificate issued by the
FAA to a carrier or to air personnel as a sanction for violation of its
regulations.
Before 1987, actions for civil penalties for violations of FAA safety
regulations were brought in the district courts by the Department of Jus-
tice on recommendations from the FAA. This arrangement was criti-
cized as being ineffective and, in 1987, Congress enacted a demonstration
program, allowing the FAA to assess civil monetary penalties of up to
$50,000 through an administrative process which included both prosecu-
tory and adjudicatory authority. Two years later, when the demonstra-
tion program came up for renewal, there was general agreement that the
administrative assessment of penalties should continue. The debate
however, centered on the question of whether the FAA should be re-
sponsible for the adjudication of penalties-the unitary model-or
whether the authority should be assigned to the independent NTSB,
which already had adjudicatory authority in certificate revocation ac-
tions. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS),
which had been asked to study the issue, recommended that the NTSB
should continue to adjudicate certificate cases as before, however, the
exception would be that authority to adjudicate civil penalty cases in-
volving pilots and flight engineers would also be given to the NTSB."3
In addition, the ACUS recommended that the FAA would have to
continue to have the authority to prosecute both certificate and civil
penalty cases, subject, of course, to APA separation of function require-
ments and to adjudicate all other penalty cases except those involving
pilots and flight engineers. In renewing the program, Congress enacted
legislation accepting the ACUS recommendations, but modified it in one
133. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a
Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389, 395-96 (1991). The
FAA was also assigned certain operational authority at air terminals. Relevantly, the
FAA is the employer of air traffic controllers at airports.
134. See Recommendation 91-8: Adjudication of Civil Penalties Under the Federal
Aviation Act, in ACUS, supra note 132 at 40, 46. The recommendation explained that the
transfer of adjudicative authority for civil penalties assessed against pilots and flight engi-
neers would "eliminate perceived conflicts of interest" in those cases in which "conflict is
most likely between FAA employees with operational responsibility for air traffic control
and persons subject to civil penalty authority (i.e., pilots and flight engineers)." Id.
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respect by adding mechanics and repair persons to the adjudicatory ju-
risdiction of NTSB."3' The statute required that NTSB be "bound by all
validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations" administered by
the FAA and by "written agency policy guidance available to the pub-
lic.., unless the [NTSB] finds an interpretation is arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not according to law.'
136
The report of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion explained the rationale of Congress in adopting this administrative
arrangement.13 ' As stated by the Committee, the main argument for
transferring all adjudication in penalty cases to the NTSB was the famil-
iar one: if one agency, the FAA, were responsible both for prosecution
and decision making, this would be unfair and create an appearance of
unfairness. The Committee, however, refused to credit this argument in
its entirety, saying that on the basis of the information available, the
FAA's exercise of adjudicatory functions had not been "unfair" and the
committee was unwilling to modify administrative procedures because of
"perceptions of unfairness, when these perceptions have no basis in real-
ity. ' ' 13 Moreover, the Committee stated that a transfer of authority for
all civil penalty cases to the NTSB would involve that agency in adjudica-
tion in areas where it had no expertise and remove responsibility from
135. See 49 U.S.C. § 46301(d)(5)(B) (1994).
136. Id. § 46301(d)(5)(C). The ACUS Report, which preceded the Martin decision,
discussed the issue of NTSB deference to FAA policy positions. See Perritt, supra note
132, at 822-24. The Report for Recommendation expressed the view that while FAA rules
promulgated under 5 U.S.C. § 553 were entitled to deference, "positions taken by FAA
advocates are not entitled to deference simply because the advocate expressed them" and
"propositions articulated in policy statements, press releases, or guidance to FAA em-
ployees are not entitled to any particular effect . I..." d. at 823-24. On the deference is-
sue in the air safety program, see Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1148, n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(reasoning that the Martin standard was not applicable in the FAA-NTSB context). The
statute also provides that the Administrator of FAA may obtain judicial review of an or-
der of NTSB if he or she determines that the order will have significant adverse impact on
the implementation of the Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 46301(d)(6). OSHA does not limit the
right of the OSH Administration to seek review of Review Commission decisions in this
way. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1994).
137. See H.R. REP. No. 102-671, at 7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792, 796
(indicating the Congress intended to make civil penalties a permanent feature without the
enforcement provisions governing air traffic safety).
138. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 798. The Committee also said that "to
act on perceptions of unfairness would be to create a precedent requiring congress [sic] to
establish an extensive new administrative structure to handle civil penalty cases under
more than 200 other statutes." Id. at 9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 797-98. The
Committee, quoting the ACUS Report, also observed that "respondents in enforcement
proceedings have an economic interest in the establishment or maintenance of the most
cumbersome procedural requirements possible ...... Id. at 8, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 797.
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the FAA, which has both the necessary staff and experience to perform
the function effectively.139 Congress, accordingly, decided that it would
not transfer the adjudication of all penalty cases to the NTSB.
On the other hand, the Committee continued NTSB adjudication re-
sponsibility for certificate revocation cases and added to the NTSB's ex-
isting adjudicatory authority over certificate revocation cases the respon-
sibility for penalty cases involving certain categories of airline personnel.
On this issue, the Committee viewed FAA adjudicatory authority not as
a problem of the "unfairness," but rather as involving a potential conflict
of interest. Since the FAA operates the air traffic control system, and
since some civil penalty cases involving pilots would turn on whether the
responsibility for an accident was attributable to the pilot or to the air
controller, the Committee expressed concern that, since controller re-
sponsibility could lead to tort action against the FAA, the FAA would
have a conflict of interest in deciding the case. Similar issues could arise
with regard to flight engineers, and, "in the interest of consistent treat-
ment of airline employees certificated by FAA," the Committee and
Congress also provided for NTSB adjudicatory jurisdiction over me-
chanics and repair persons.
1 40
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In determining the structure of an administrative agency, and in par-
ticular, in deciding the allocation of agency functions, Congress is con-
fronted with competing values and interests. On one hand, any mixing of
adjudicatory decision-making functions with investigation and prosecu-
tion functions threatens the fairness of the proceeding, and, apart from
the reality, gives members of the public the appearance of bias and pre-
judgement in agency decision making. On the other hand, agency effi-
ciency depends in no small measure on the existence of a single policy-
making authority, within the agency, and on the availability of the exper-
tise and experience of the entire agency, to agency decision makers. This
conflict of values is exacerbated since all agency functions, including ad-
judicatory decision-making functions and investigation and prosecution
functions inherently involve some policy-making activity, 4' so that the
139. See id. at 9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 798.
140. Id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 798.
141. Even in a program such as OSHA, in which policymaking is achieved primarily
through legislative rulemaking and interpretation of rules, adjudicatory decisionmaking, in
applying rules and interpretations in particular cases, necessarily requires some policy de-
cisions by the official charged with the decision since the "existing" law is typically not
congruent with the specific facts. Also, the investigation and prosecution role involves the
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separation of investigation and prosecution from decision making inevi-
tably fractures the policy making, and thus tends to undermine agency
unified operation.
The dilemma inherent in this conflict of values has been solved in vari-
ous ways in the administrative history of our governmental system. The
APA structural model gives primary emphasis to the need for unified
agency policy making by assigning to the highest agency official authority
to make the policy decisions involved in both prosecution and adjudica-
tion, and by limiting the separation of functions requirements to indi-
viduals in the agency staff. This arrangement, while promoting agency
efficiency and unified policy making, has lent itself some to public criti-
cism on the ground that, in appearance, and perhaps in reality, the same
individuals are both prosecuting and deciding cases.
With the Taft-Hartley Act, a new paradigm was developed by Con-
gress: separation of functions would be imposed on an institutional level,
a solution originally rejected by Congress in enacting the APA. Similarly
in OSHA and MSHA, and to some extent, in the FAA-NTSB arrange-
ment, Congress enacted institutional separation of functions, although in
significant respects different from the NLRB structure. In all of these
administrative arrangements, Congress gave major emphasis to the im-
portance of separating prosecution from decision-making responsibili-
ties, and avoiding any appearance of unfairness, while sacrificing, at least
to some extent, the unity agency of policymaking.
This movement from the unitary APA model to the institutional sepa-
ration model has been related to the changes in the way administrative•. 142
agencies make agency policy. 2 In the era of the APA, policymaking was
largely accomplished through case-by-case adjudication. In order to as-
sure that the Agency head would ultimately be responsible for all critical
policymaking, it was therefore necessary to maintain the unitary model,
with the Agency head the ultimate adjudicative decision maker. How-
ever, in time, case-by-case policymaking was replaced by policymaking
decision as to which cases to investigate and, critically, in which cases a complaint should
be filed. The Supreme Court has held that these prosecutory decisions are presumptively
not subject to court review since there is no "law to apply." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985). In other words, the Prosecutory Agency's decisions are not legal deci-
sions, but policy decisions which "often involve a complicated balancing of a number of
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise." Id. But see id. at 825 n.2 (discussing the
possibility of a different result if legal questions were involved).
142. The historical argument presented here is based on a thoughtful and ground-
breaking article by Professor Daniel J. Gifford. See generally Gifford, supra note 15. For
a critical view of "separation of functions" requirements for administrative agencies, see
generally William F. Pederson, Jr., The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory
Agencies, 64 VA. L. REV. 991 (1978).
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by legislative rule, as was the case in agencies such as the OSH Admini-
stration and the EPA. '43 With the great increase in legislative rulemak-
ing, there was no longer any pressing need from a policy view for the
Agency head to decide adjudicatory cases, since agency policy was no
longer established through the adjudicatory mode. In the institutional
separation arrangement, therefore, decision making could be delegated
to an independent agency and thus accomplish more complete separation
of functions without significantly undermining the unity of policymaking.
With these developments in mind, differences in structure and proce-
dure between the NLRB and the OSH Administration, differences par-
ticularly between the role of the five-member Board and the Review
Commission, become more understandable. The Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 imposed institutional separation on an agency that continued to
make policy on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the five-member Board
continued to be the main policy-making component of the NLRB, and
the General Counsel's role was statutorily limited to prosecution and in-
vestigation. In the OSHA program, on the other hand, the OSH Ad-
ministration in the Department of Labor conducted rulemaking, which
was the main vehicle for policymaking. As a result, the main policy-
making role in OSHA was assigned to the OSH Administration and the
Review Commission was limited to adjudicatory decisionmaking in a
non-policy-making mode. So viewed, the NLRB was given an interme-
diate structure, between the APA unitary model and full institutional
separation that was realized in OSHA.
These differences in allocation of authority between the OSH Admini-
stration and the NLRB account for specific variations in the way the two
agencies operate. Because the Board makes policy, both the General
Counsel in his or her prosecutory decision-making role and the courts in
review proceedings defer to Board views on policy matters. Under
OSHA, however, the Supreme Court has decided quite properly that
143. Professor Gifford also connects the development of policymaking by rules to the
fact that in agencies with a high-volume caseload, "the most practical means for policy-
making is rulemaking." Gifford, supra note 15, at 969 n.3. It should be noted, however,
that legislative rulemaking has also resulted, and perhaps more importantly, from the na-
ture of the regulatory activity undertaken by the Agency. It would be inconceivable that
detailed regulatory requirements imposed by the OSH Administration and EPA could be
established in adjudicatory decisions. The success of this health and environmental regu-
lation depends, in large measure, on the promulgation of detailed rules, developed after
rulemaking with extensive public participation, and affording the regulated public ade-
quate notice of what is expected of them. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing the advantages of policymaking through
rulemaking). The movement toward rulemaking has taken place even in agencies such as
the OSH Administration which do not have a particularly high volume case-load.
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deference is due to the OSH Administration, which is the policy-making
entity in the program. In addition, the General Counsel of the NLRB is
not authorized to seek review of the decisions of the Board, which he is
bound to follow, while the OSH Administration is expressly allowed to
file petitions in the court of appeals to review adverse Review Commis-
sion decisions. For essentially the same reasons, the Board is a party in
review proceedings, since it has a policy interest in defending its deci-
sions, while the Review Commission, like a district court, has no such
role.
In one respect, however, both the Board and the Review Commission
are the same: neither can review prosecutory decisions by the General
Counsel or the OSH Administration, respectively. The underlying ra-
tionale, however, is somewhat different. In the NLRB arrangement it is
the General Counsel's prosecutory authority that is exclusive and not
subject to Board review. In the case of OSHA, it is the OSH Admini-
stration's broad policy-making authority, which encompasses the admin-
istrative responsibility for prosecutory decisions which must be accepted
by the Review Commission.
Some critics of OSHA have pointed to its institutional separation as
one of the main culprits for the disappointing performance of OSHA.
44
In particular, conflict in critical policy matters between the OSH Ad-
ministration and the Review Commission accounts, for these critics, for
the general ineffectiveness of OSHA enforcement. To be sure, in the
legislative development of OSHA, efforts of employer groups to separate
the responsibility for both adjudication and rulemaking from the OSH
Administration were concededly made for the purpose of limiting the
Department of Labor's power and to prevent its abuse.14 ' Further, there
144. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 8, § 9.9, at 100. ("The inefficient multi-agency
structure Congress chose to implement [the OSHA] regime ranks high on the list of the
many explanations for [its] poor performance."); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0.
McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulating Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 2-10 (1989) (discussing the structural impediments which inhibit the OSH
Administration's quality work product). Davis and Pierce have drawn a more general
conclusion: at the legislative stage of establishing a regulatory program, if the opposition is
strong, the opposition "can render the program ineffective by... [r]equiring [the estab-
lishment of] a decisionmaking structure with strict agency-based separation of functions".
This, the authors say, is "one of the most powerful ways of reducing the effectiveness of
a regulatory program." DAVIS & PIERCE supra note 8, at § 9.9, at 101. A similar view was
suggested by the House Committee in reporting on the FAA-NTSB air transport safety
legislation in 1992. Cf H.R. REP. No. 102-671, at 7-8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792,
796-97 (noting that most administrative agencies do not employ a strict separation of func-
tions).
145. See supra note 27 (discussing of remarks by Senator Dominick).
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can be little doubt that on many critical issues the Review Commission
has blocked significant OSHA enforcement initiatives and has reversed
OSH Administration sanctions in particular and important cases. The
recent Arcadian decision is only the latest example of the Review Com-
mission setting aside a significant OSH Administration enforcement
policy.
But this view must be tempered in a number of respects. First, it
would be difficult to maintain that disabling the agency was the exclusive
motivation for establishing a separate Review Commission. As dis-
cussed, fairness and the appearance of fairness in adjudication have long
been good-faith concerns of legislators and scholars who have questioned
the combination of functions in administrative agencies. As has been
frequently noted, interests of procedural fairness almost inevitably con-
flict with efficiency of agency operations. The purpose of checks-and-
balances is to "check" the exercise of power. There is no doubt that
OSHA enforcement would be more effective if a compliance officer were
authorized to assess penalties on the spot, with no review available, but it
could not be seriously suggested that this "highly effective" procedure
should be adopted.146
Congress is charged with the responsibility of deciding the proper bal-
ance between the interests served by differing procedural models. Is
OSHA's split-enforcement arrangement more "fair"? It would be diffi-
cult to say. 117 Does it appear more fair? It seems likely. Has split en-
146. Congress refused to give authority to OSH Administration Compliance officers to
"red tag," that is, to shut down administratively working conditions that presented an im-
minent danger of death or serious physical harm to employees. See Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1980) (discussing the legislative history surrounding the con-
sideration and rejection of "shut-down" provisions in OSHA).
147. The Administrative Conference of the United States studied the experience in
the OSHA and MSHA programs with the "split-enforcement" model and was "unable to
conclude whether the model achieves a greater fairness in adjudication than does the tra-
ditional structural model." 51 Fed. Reg. 46,985, 46,986 (1986). "Because fairness is an im-
portant, but an unquantifiable and subjective value," the Conference took no position on
which structural model was preferable. Id. It did decry the policy conflict between the
OSH Administration and the Review Commission and recommended that "generally
speaking" Congress should provide that the "adjudicatory agency must accept the rule-
making agency's interpretation of the standard" unless, arbitrary, capricious, or inconsis-
tent with law. Id. This view, was adopted by the Supreme Court in the Martin case.
ACUS also noted that this issue was "largely avoided" in the later enacted mine safety
legislation. Thus the Senate Report on the MSHA bill stated explicitly: "Since the Secre-
tary of Labor is charged with responsibility for implementing this Act, it is the intention of
the Committee, consistent with generally accepted precedent, that the Secretary's inter-
pretations of the law and regulations shall be given weight by both the Commission and
the courts." S. REP. No. 95-181, at 49 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3448;
see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-655, at 60 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485,
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forcement undermined effective enforcement? In making this judgment,
we might consider how the unitary model might function in the OSHA
program.'48 In the first place, an independent administrative law judge
would conduct the hearing and make the initial decision. The ultimate
decision would be made by an official in the Department of Labor,
probably the Secretary of Labor, but his or her right to consult staff from
the OSHA Administration would be limited as a legal matter by the
APA and, as a public appearance matter, it would be limited to an even
greater degree. There is no clear reason to believe that under this uni-
tary arrangement, the decision makers would be more expert on safety
and health matters than the present Review Commission or that their
policymaking would be more in tune with OSH Administration policy.
The proper working of the OSHA split-enforcement model depends,
as the Supreme Court has insisted, on the recognition that it is the OSH
Administration who makes policy for the program. While there may
have been differences of view on this issue, after many years of litigation
and two Supreme Court decisions, it might have been expected that the
debate would be over. It is therefore disappointing that the Review
Commission in the recent Arcadian case has resisted, with little legiti-
mate justification, the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue of OSH
Administration policy supremacy. It is noteworthy that in the NLRB the
General Counsel has, for the most part, yielded to the Board's policy
role. 149 The Review Commission, however, has not; we may then suggest
that an adjudicatory agency does not easily reconcile itself to a non-
policy role as would a prosecutory official, such as the General Counsel.
The ultimate rapprochement between the OSH Administration and the
Review Commission thus remains elusive.
3508 (noting the limited scope of review accorded the MSH Review Commission); Brock
v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (opinion by Scalia, J.)
(emphasizing the great deference accorded to the Secretary of Labor under the MSHA).
148. In any event, there has been no significant effort, even by those who urge stricter
OSHA enforcement, to change the institutional separation structure in OSHA. See gener-
ally Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, H.R. REP. No. 102-663,
at pt. 1 (1992).
149. Cf. STRAUSS & HIGGINS, supra note 44, § 6.11, at 105 (explaining that authority
to institute contempt proceedings rests with the General Counsel, but is contingent upon
approval of the Board).
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